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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CPLR 302(a)(2): Personal jurisdiction secured over nondomiciliary
who through an agent committed a tort in New York.
CPLR 302(a)(2) authorizes the exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a nondomiciliary who commits a tortious act (except defamation)
within New York either in person or by an agent.51 Neilson v. Sal
Martorano, Inc.52 is a healthy example of the successful invocation of
this provision against a nondomiciliary who through an agent commits
a tort within this state.
In Neilson, plaintiff sought to recover from defendant Perez
moneys allegedly paid to her by the defendant corporation to satisfy
certain mortgages. Plaintiff alleged that no consideration for said mort-
gages was provided by the former defendant. Defendant Perez moved
to dismiss the complaint against her for want of personal jurisdiction,
but the supreme court denied her motion. On appeal the appellate
division affirmed, for there were facts tending to prove that defendant
Perez participated in fraudulent conveyances within this state through
agents.5 3 "A trier of the facts," the court concluded, "could find that
the defendant Perez conspired with her brother to effect fraudulent
conveyances, that he acted as her agent in preparing and recording
the mortgages and in the payment to her in satisfaction of the mort-
gages, and that those acts therefore constituted tortious acts in New
York."5
4
CPLR 315: Indigent has constitutional right to free publication in
divorce action.
The right of indigents to maintain marital actions regardless of
their inability to pay court fees and costs has been established. 5 This
does not, however, break all financial barriers confronting an indigent
cases. ... may well be tempted by the expectation that the same rule will be reciprocally
applied .. ." A. Miliner Co. v. Noudar, LDA, 24 App. Div. 2d 326, 329, 266 N.Y.S.2d 289,
294 (Ist Dep't 1966).
Limitations were inserted deliberately into CPLR 302 to keep said provision "well
within constitutional bounds." TwELrr REP. 341.
51 See 1 WK&M 802.10.
52 36 App. Div. 2d 625, 319 N.Y.S.2d 480 (2d Dep't 1971).
53 Id., 319 N.YS.2d at 481.
54Id. at 626, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
55 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court,
stated:
Our conclusion is that, given the basic position of the marriage relationship in
this society's hierarchy of values and the concomitant state monopolization of the
means for legally dissolving this relationship, due process does prohibit the
state from denying, solely because of inability to pay, access to its courts to in-
dividuals who seek judicial dissolution of their marriages.
Boddie recognized an alternative to publication, i.e., "service at defendant's known
address by mail and posted service .... " Id. at 382. See also Note, Litigation Costs: The
Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. L.J. 516 (1968).
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